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Content protection is a key component for the success of a multimedia 
services platform, as proven by the plethora of solutions currently on the 
market. In this paper we analyze a new network scenario where permanent 
bidirectional connectivity and video-aware encryption technologies allow a 
trustful operation of ubiquitous end devices. We propose new scalable 
models for a content protection architecture that may achieve dramatic 
improvement in robustness, reliability, and scalability. Selective ciphering and 
countermeasures are included in those models, together with several 
examples of their application. 
Introduction 
Protecting audio/video content to restrict access to 
it from unauthorized hands is a key principle for mone-
tizing multimedia delivery services over any kind of 
platform. From the early days of analog television this 
protection has been based mostly on cryptography 
leading to a continuing struggle between piracy 
attacks and recovery from compromised platforms 
through the renewal of technology. For almost two 
decades the scenario has been quite stable, based on 
unidirectional broadcast networks which pushed vir-
tually all the responsibility for content protection 
to the client device. Thus there was a tradeoff 
between the strength of the secure client device 
(hardware or software based) and its associated cost: 
platforms delivering high quality content are attrac-
tive targets for attack and therefore require stronger 
and more expensive protection solutions [7]. 
The scenario in the last few years, however, has 
changed drastically with the growing availability of 
bidirectional networks that enable the permanent 
connection of end devices to the network, and even-
tually to operator information services [3]. In some 
cases this connection is the primary vehicle for the 
delivery of the content itself (e.g., Internet Protocol 
television (IPTV) platforms [4] or up-and-coming 
over-the-top (OTT) service providers), while in other 
cases a hybrid network is deployed, with a bidirec-
tional network complementing the existing broadcast 
platform. This paper will demonstrate how the availa-
bility of this connection, which has already enabled a 
number of new architectures, has the potential to be 
of great benefit for improving the efficiency of content 
protection technologies, introducing new models 
which maintain or increase the level of security at a 
much lower cost. 
In order to demonstrate how the new connected 
paradigm can help with content security, we will start 
by summarizing the existing content protection solu-
tions, from the pure broadcast environments to the 
first architectures which already leverage a permanent 
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connection to the servers. Our first proposal will then 
be an innovative leak mitigation algorithm which 
offers a highly efficient and cost-effective means to 
react to piracy from a new perspective. Next, we will 
introduce a completely new approach to content pro-
tection based on implementing in the network the 
logic that drives the current smartcard-based solu-
tions. We will then propose a very efficient algorithm 
for content scrambling that leverages the deep analy-
sis of the content that can be done by specialized 
servers in the network, leading to very secure results 
which require a very low computational cost in end 
devices, which are usually quite resource limited. 
Classic Conditional Access Architectures 
Conditional access systems (CAS) enable pay tele-
vision (TV) platforms to deliver content through a 
shared media which is accessible by more users than 
the ones paying for it. Satellite direct to home (DTH) 
is the most evident case, but terrestrial distribution 
and even more controlled environments such as cable 
or IPTV platforms make extensive use of CAS tech-
nologies [2]. The principle behind CAS operation is 
cryptography: content is encrypted ("scrambled") 
before being distributed, and the resources for 
decrypting it (the "licenses" with the keys, in most 
cases) are delivered only to authorized client devices, 
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those in which a "secure client" is capable of extract-
ing the key from the data delivered by the CAS and, 
based on internal rules, deciding if it should be applied 
to the local descrambler to enable access to the con-
tent. The architecture of a conditional access system is 
depicted in Figure 1. 
The presence of a secure client with decision 
capability is a fundamental principle of the traditional 
CAS architecture: it provides a high degree of flexi-
bility but it also opens a gap for vulnerability in the 
content protection architecture. If a hacker manages 
to manipulate this client, keys from devices entitled to 
access the content may be faked or exposed and then 
transferred to non-authorized devices which would 
then enable free access to all content (the well-known 
"control word sharing" technique is a good example 
[1, 6]). For this reason, the design and implementa-
tion of the secure client is key for the robustness of 
the solution: pure software implementations on 
generic hardware are cheap and easy to renew, but 
are also quite weak, while implementations on spe-
cialized hardware (e.g., a smartcard or a PCMCIA 
card) are stronger but more expensive [15]. 
An alternative conditional access architecture 
exists, which is based on a permanent connection 
between the client devices and the operator servers. 
We refer to this architecture as "network-based CAS." 
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Architecture of conditional access. 
The main concept behind this approach is to shift the 
intelligence and decision capability from the client 
device to the network: decryption keys are sent only 
to client devices which are entitled to receive them, so 
even if a local application in those devices is hacked, 
they will not be able to access unauthorized channels, 
simply because they will not have the keys for 
decrypting them, as illustrated in Figure 2. There is 
still the risk, however, that the keys sent to a legal 
device may be extracted and published or transferred 
to illegal devices. To mitigate this risk, the network-
based solution relies on the cryptographic capabilities 
offered by the latest generation of video chipsets, 
which include a key decryption hierarchy (the so 
called "key ladder") within the chipset itself, based on 
a core unique key stored in each chip, which only the 
operator or the CAS provider knows. In this way, 
the decryption keys are already encrypted with the 
unique secret key of their chipset when they are sent 
to customers, so when the content is accessed the prod-
uct decryption key is not exposed in the clear apart 
from the chipset and therefore cannot be published or 
communicated to other devices, as illustrated in 
Figure 3. A consequence of this scheme is that a large 
number of encrypted keys must be sent on a periodic 
basis, because each key needs to be encrypted and 
sent as many times as needed. Therefore, this 
approach is not appropriate for pure broadcast plat-
forms, through it is applicable for connected environ-
ments where the client devices can retrieve the keys 
from specialized servers using unicast connections. 
Leak Mitigation Algorithm for Network-Based CAS 
We now propose an algorithm to manage the risk 
of client device manipulation that was previously 
identified in network-based CAS. 
Problem Statement 
We described above how network-based CAS 
avoids the risk that a legal client device may be manipu-
lated to extend its entitlements. We also noted that 
this model still presents some risk that the keys that 
are legally sent to the client device may be leaked [2]. 
The innovative approach that we propose here is 
a forensic mechanism capable of detecting the source 
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Key ladder in a network based CAS client. 
of the leak when it occurs (i.e., when the key has 
already been published or transmitted). The algorithm 
is based on the fact that the source of the leak is 
always a legal device. With a network-based CAS 
architecture, a non-legal device would not receive 
keys, so it cannot leak anything. If a legal device 
which has been propagating leaks can be identified, it 
can be banned, thus fixing the security breach. 
Proposed Solution 
The core idea of the proposed key mitigation algo-
rithm is summarized as follows: 
• The content (the audio/video stream) is over-
encrypted using two or more different keys, in a 
way that any of those keys alone is enough for 
decrypting the content. This scheme can be 
achieved in different ways: simulcasting small 
pieces of the content encrypted with different 
keys, or using a layered key scheme (such as the 
Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) entitle-
ment control message (ECM) mechanism) and 
sending the low-level key encrypted with several 
higher-level keys. 
• The population of legal terminals is logically 
divided into as many groups as different keys 
have been defined in the over-encryption. Each 
group will receive only one key through the uni-
cast connection. 
• If a key leak is detected, the source of the leak 
(a specific legal device or devices) may be deter-
mined by isolating the exact key that has been 
published or distributed to pirate devices, and it is 
then assigned to a sub-group. 
• The process is iterated with a different distribution 
of the groups, and the detection is repeated. 
• Nevertheless, the algorithm can be challenged by 
pirates using several hacked devices simultane-
ously to extract the keys. If several keys are pub-
lished, it will not be possible to identify the group 
in that iteration. However, an attempt to defeat 
the leak mitigation algorithm in this way will only 
increase the number of iterations required to per-
form the isolation: the mechanism will eventu-
ally work as planned, and all pirate devices will be 
detected and banned. 
Through careful selection of the group distribu-
tion algorithm, the isolation of the exact device (or 
devices) producing the leak can be done in just a few 
iterations. A basic example: using just two keys per 
iteration, groups can be defined according to bit N of 
their device identifier (ID), with N being incremented 
in each iteration; if there is a device id space of B bits, 
with just B iterations the source of the leak will be 
identified. 
The architecture of the network-based CAS, 
which is based on a high key rotation and a massive 
unicast delivery of keys, is very appropriate for this 
algorithm. 
Smartcard in the Network 
In this section, we propose an architecture that 
will mitigate the weaknesses of network-based CAS 
without requiring expensive hardware in the client 
device, as already identified in previous sections. 
Problem Statement 
We demonstrated previously that content protec-
tion solutions which rely on a secure client are highly 
flexible as a result of the local decision capability, 
however, they also present a weakness from the secu-
rity point of view unless expensive hardware such a 
smartcard is used. On the other hand, network-based 
CAS provides robust security without a need for 
expensive hardware in the client device, but does so 
at the cost of lower flexibility. Commercial models, 
which require massive simultaneous decision capa-
bility at the client side, would not be possible with 
pure network-based CAS. Examples of such com-
mercial models include: 
• Pay-per-time. The end user pays for a specific 
amount of time which can be consumed at inter-
vals of arbitrary length ("slots") on any channel or 
subset of channels. The slots consumed by each 
customer are typically controlled locally by the 
secure client. The secure client tracks usage and 
stops granting access to the content when the 
time credit has expired. It is not possible to do 
the same from a centralized server because it 
would require permanent bidirectional communi-
cation with each client device. On the other hand, 
it's not possible to use the key delivery mechanism 
used in network-based CAS either, because keys 
would need to be provisioned in advance and 
there would not be a reliable mechanism to check 
if they have been used by the client or not. 
Moreover, the number of keys in such a scenario 
would be extremely high (one per slot). 
• Impulse pay-per-view (IPPV). When access to a 
highly promoted live event can be purchased on 
a pay-per-view basis, it is quite common to see 
thousands or even millions of purchase attempts 
in a very short period of time just before the event 
starts. (A good example is a soccer match). The 
most scalable implementation for this scenario is 
a complete "local" purchase in the secure client 
which is later logged securely on the service 
provider backend. 
Proposed Solution 
To keep the high flexibility from client-side deci-
sion power while still leveraging the security and cost 
savings of the connected scenario, we present new 
concept: the network smartcard [14]. A server in the 
cloud, located close to the end device, implements 
the same functionality as a traditional smartcard: it 
stores all cryptographic information required to access 
any content provided by the operator, but it will pro-
vide the corresponding keys to the client device only 
if the user is entitled to receive it. 
The key design principle for this solution is the 
distributed nature of the network smartcard servers 
which, like physical smartcards, do not require a per-
manent connection to the operator's core servers to 
execute their daily work: delivering keys to the 
descrambler hardware. This also enables a business 
model which does not require a connection to the 
core server at peak times of usage. 
Of course, once the network smartcard decides to 
grant access to an asset, the key must be delivered 
securely. The most appropriate mechanism for this is 
by leveraging the same key ladder described for the 
network CAS: the key is encrypted with the chipset's 
unique key and then delivered via a regular channel 
(not necessarily secure) to the end device. Data dis-
tributed in this way cannot be used by a different 
device, and the key itself is not exposed in the clear 
anywhere in the authorized device. Moreover, the 
volatile nature of distributing the key in this way is 
also a plus for security: once used, the key (in memo-
ry) is not stored in the device. 
Figure 4 shows the end-to-end architecture of the 
network smartcard solution: the critical link is now 
the connection between the network smartcard server 
and the end device. The connection between the core 
servers and the network smartcard servers is only used 
sporadically: to download new entitlements (as enti-
tlement management messages (EMMs) in the classic 
CAS environment) when users purchase new prod-
ucts, and to download cryptographic information 
(which can now be done on a very infrequent basis). 
This solution is extremely secure, even more 
secure than a smartcard-based scheme, because 
the servers where all the critical information is stored 
are not physically accessible to hackers. Communication 
of the key to the chipset is as secure as when using a 
smartcard (which usually also implement a secure 
channel based on embedded chipset security). 
In terms of scalability, the number of network 
smartcard servers grows linearly with the number of 
connected end devices. The cost per user, however, 
is estimated to be an order of magnitude lower than a 
smartcard due to economies of scale: 
• The traffic from the smartcard servers to the end 
devices will be unicast, as in the network CAS 
architecture. The volume of data required will 
now be higher, because the granularity of the 
access control will in most cases be finer: for 
instance, the usual practice of changing the 
encryption key at regular intervals during 
the transmission of linear channels (cryptoperiod) 
will require the communication of such key every 
time it is changed. In addition, even with cryp-
toperiods on the order of tens of seconds, this 
leads to negligible bandwidth. For example, trans-
mitting 1024 bits (enough room for a 128 bit key, 
metadata and transmission overhead) in a cryp-
toperiod of 10 seconds (an extreme case) results 
in 0.1 kb/s. From the server perspective, if a sin-
gle server is connected to, e.g., 50,000 users, the 
aggregated bandwidth used to communicate 
the keys would be just 5 Mb/s. 
• The computing power required at the smartcard 
server is mainly driven by the encryption that has 
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Network smartcard architecture. 
to be done for every product or cryptoperiod for 
every user when the global encryption key is 
encrypted with the chipset's unique key. Using 
the example described above, in the worst-case 
scenario, 50,000 users would require 5,000 sym-
metric encryptions (Advanced Encryption 
Standard 128 (AES 128)), per second, or a peak 
encryption performance of 640 kb/s, something 
easily achievable with off-the-shelf available 
hardware (or even software). 
• Latency is in this case an important factor, espe-
cially when decrypting linear channels during the 
cryptoperiod, since the key for the new period 
should be ready in the chipset on time. However, 
with cryptoperiods on the order of tens of sec-
onds this is not expected to be a problem. 
Content-Aware Content Protection 
The traditional approach to CAS systems assumes 
that from a cryptographic point of view, the whole 
media stream being processed can be considered as a 
homogeneous set of data. However, prior knowledge 
about the media data structure allows enhancing the 
functionality of a content protection system, adding 
features such as partial decoding of the video stream 
(required for network processing systems, like a 
network-based personal video recorder (PVR)), more 
efficient scrambling schemes, or free preview of parts 
of the content. 
Selective Scrambling 
The concept of selective scrambling means that, 
when cryptographically protecting a multimedia asset 
or stream, only a (typically reduced) fraction of the 
data is scrambled, while the remainder is distributed 
in the clear. There are two main reasons for this 
approach: on one hand, by leaving some specific 
information unscrambled, intermediate video-
processing systems can access the part of the data 
which is required for them to work correctly; on the 
other, keeping a reduced bit rate of scrambled packets 
can be the only possible solution for decoding devices 
with limited computing power, such as customer 
premises equipment (CPE). The former problem is rela-
tively simple, as the specific data headers required by 
the network processors are typically known. The latter 
is more interesting, as it is necessary to find a good 
balance point between the scrambling rate and pro-
tection effectiveness. 
Problem statement. Let us consider a client that 
is not entitled to receive an asset and which there-
fore lacks the appropriate keys to descramble it. Any 
user watching this asset will experience the same 
effect as a user that loses exactly the same packets 
that are scrambled in the stream. From this point of 
view, selective scrambling can be seen as a reverse 
rate-distortion optimization (RDO) problem. Unlike 
the typical RDO problem, however, the aim here is 
maximizing the final distortion for a specific rate of 
scrambled packets [10]. In an ideal case, the resulting 
distortion should be high enough that no useful data 
can be extracted from the content. However, for many 
practical applications, a suitable solution could involve 
producing video with a quality bad enough to dis-
courage any potential user from watching it. Therefore, 
in order to find a good selective scrambling algorithm, 
we use techniques for quality of experience analysis. 
Notwithstanding, in designing a selective scram-
bling scheme, one must remember why the algorithm 
is required: the scrambled video is processed in the 
network and the descrambler has limited computing 
power. In addition, using a lightweight scheme in the 
scrambler as well as the descrambler would broaden 
the applicability of the scheme. Thus the requirements 
for the selective scrambling algorithm include: 
1. To be transparent to video servers, 
2. To scramble only a (low) percentage of the video 
packets, 
3. To be implementable with low computational 
cost, and 
4. To maximize the distortion introduced by the 
encrypted packets (i.e., do not allow the video 
sequence to be recovered from the unscrambled 
packets without heavy impairment). 
Proposed solution. Most existing commercial 
CAS solutions support fulfilling requirement 1. 
However, they typically rely on full-stream encryp-
tion. There are several solutions in the literature that 
address the partial encryption of the video stream. A 
state-of-the-art can be found in [8], which describes a 
set of encryption techniques that allow good visual 
degradation of encrypted video while scrambling 
only a portion of the packets. However, all of them 
either require deep analysis of the video stream (thus 
not satisfying requirement 3) or scrambling the video 
headers to make video undecodable (not meeting 
condition 1). 
In [5], the authors propose encoding the most 
important data at a higher level of security than the 
less important data, which also reduces complexity. 
In [13], H.264 video elements are divided into differ-
ent classes, which are provided with different protec-
tion. In [16] different encryption levels can be reached 
by analyzing the entropy coding of the H.264 stream. 
These methods satisfy condition 2, but require ana-
lyzing H.264 up to at least macroblock level, which 
might be computationally expensive, especially when 
context-adaptive binary arithmetic coding (CABAC) 
entropy coding is used, as in most IPTV streams. 
The approach we propose is exploiting the error 
resilience characteristics of video coding standards such 
as, but not limited to, H.264, where video frames are 
divided into slices. It has been shown that when a frag-
ment of the video slice is lost, the rest of the slice 
becomes almost undecodable [10]. Therefore video can 
be degraded to an acceptable level for safe transmis-
sion by scrambling only a small set of data in each slice. 
This solution is especially suitable for multimedia 
deployments because: 
• Commercial encoders use a low number of slices 
per frame (typically 1 in standard-definition tele-
vision (SDTV), and 4 to 8 in high-definition 
television (HDTV). Thus the fraction of video 
packets to encrypt (scrambling rate) is kept low. 
• The information required to process video in a 
video server (i.e., stream and picture-level infor-
mation) is contained in other H.264 syntax ele-
ments called network abstraction layer units 
(NALUs). NALUs are not slices, but reside in the 
slice header. 
• The only video stream analysis required for this 
solution is detecting the type of NAL units, detect-
ing slices and slice headers, and reading the coding 
type of each frame. This can be performed in 
the H.264 network abstraction layer, and thus 
does not require analyzing anything beyond the 
Table I. Minimum scrambling rate required to completely loss the video signal, as subjectively assessed by expert 
viewers in laboratory, for several content assets. Selective scrambling algorithm is compared with random packet 
scrambling. 
Content 
Advertising 
News 
Movie 
Movie 
Resolution 
676i 
576i 
1080Í 
1080Í 
Bit rate 
2.7 Mb/s 
2.7 Mb/s 
8.5 Mb/s 
15.0 Mb/s 
Scrambling rate (selective) 
1% 
1.5% 
0.8% 
0.3% 
Scrambling rate (uniform) 
15% 
15% 
10% 
5% 
slice header level. Therefore, the processing 
required is much simpler than any other selec-
tive scrambling algorithm. 
With these premises, we propose a scrambling 
scheme based on two layers [11] working within each 
slice of the encoded stream: 
1. The first layer would scramble a small set of data 
just after each slice header. This protects the video 
from real-time decoding with a very low scram-
bling rate. 
2. The second layer would randomly scramble some 
sets of data in the rest of the video coding layer 
(VCL) units, as well as other streams (e.g., audio) 
following a simple to implement rate-distortion 
model. With this second layer, two aims are met: 
first of all, audio streams are also scrambled so that 
they are heavily impaired to non-descrambling 
receivers; second, destroying the structure of the 
video stream makes it impossible to decode even 
using sophisticated offline error concealment 
methods. 
Results. We tested the algorithm with different 
scrambling rates and several types of content encoded 
in H.264. The processed video then was played with-
out correctly descrambling the packets, which results 
in packet loss. In the laboratory, expert viewers 
watched the video in order to assess the minimum 
scrambling rate at which it is impossible to extract 
any information from it (i.e., the point at which the 
image was completely impaired). This value was com-
pared with the minimum scrambling rate required to 
obtain an equivalent result by randomly encrypting 
video packets. Table I presents the results of the tests, 
and even with the limitations of the experiment it 
can be shown that by encrypting only up to two per-
cent of the transport packets, it is possible to impair 
video quality to the point that the resulting video is 
useless. 
All the video samples under study used only one 
slice per frame. For video sequences with N slices per 
frame, these values would have to be multiplied by a 
factor K < N. Even in that case, for most typical sce-
narios, the required scrambling rate would be rela-
tively low. 
Scalable Scrambling 
Scalable scrambling offers another possibility for 
selectively encrypting part of the multimedia stream. 
The approach here is scrambling part of the stream in 
such a way that the part that has been left in clear is 
a correctly decodable stream, but with lower quality 
than the original one. The underlying idea is that the 
user is provided with the same video stream at two 
levels of quality, the lower in the clear and the higher 
encrypted. In this way, users can have a free preview 
of the desired content, but they only can watch 
the higher-quality version if they have obtained the 
rights. This idea can be generalized by dividing 
the stream into a number of layers of differing qual-
ity, and encrypting each of them with a different con-
trol word (or leaving them in the clear). 
The only limitation is the ability to divide the 
coded stream into two or more different layers. In 
most coding standards it is possible in one way or 
another. For example, in MPEG-2 or H.264, this can be 
achieved by scrambling part of the frames (typically, 
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Efficient RTP scrambling architecture. 
the no-reference ones): the base layer (in the clear) 
would be a version of the original stream, but with a 
lower frame rate. With more complex coding stan-
dards, such as scalable video coding, quality layers are 
already provided, so scalable scrambling is straightfor-
ward. Depending on the coding scheme, other options 
are possible, such as scrambling different views in multi-
view video coding (MVC) or different audio compo-
nents in multi-channel audio. 
The ideas mentioned in the section on selective 
scrambling are also applicable here, in two different 
ways. First, the scrambling of the desired frames can 
also be done selectively (i.e., by only ciphering part 
of the slices, not the whole frames). Second, because 
the problem of scalable scrambling is again similar to 
an RDO, the effect of each scrambling strategy can 
be evaluated by using prediction techniques for 
packet loss effects. In this way, it is possible to adapt 
the target quality of each layer with a finer granu-
larity, provided by the packet loss effect estimation 
algorithm. 
Efficient Real Time Architectures 
The use of selective scrambling can help to 
improve not only the performance of lightweight 
client devices, but also the scalability of encrypting 
elements in the network. An architecture showing 
this scalability is depicted in Figure 5, tailored for an 
environment of multicast Real Time Transport 
Protocol (RTP) distribution. The element in the 
video headend does not perform the encryption 
itself, but simply separates video from audio, and 
labels video frame boundaries appropriately [12]. 
This network element is called a rewrapper and is 
already deployed in commercial services. With the 
information provided by the rewrapper, it is possible 
to predict the main properties of the stream struc-
ture, and roughly predict the effect of the loss of an 
RTP packet [9]. 
With this data, a content-aware smart router, act-
ing as the media delivery node to the end user, scram-
bles only the packets required to reach the desired 
impact in perceived quality. In this case, the encryp-
tion occurs at the RTP level, and in this way, the 
content-aware router only needs to process a few RTP 
packets in each stream, without the need for deep packet 
inspection. The required processing power is relatively 
small, and it is also possible to personalize scrambling 
per user or per session, hence making the system 
more robust against piracy. 
Conclusions 
We have analyzed a set of new approaches for 
content protection in a connected scenario, where 
there is a permanent link between the client devices 
and the servers in the network. This permanent con-
nectivity opens new and interesting opportunities for 
improving the security, reliability, and scalability of 
the solutions. 
We first analyzed the existing architectures and 
the inherent limitations of the currently established 
CAS technologies. Then we demonstrated how a 
network-based CAS can be enhanced with a leak miti-
gation algorithm capable of detecting and fixing 
important security breaches. We proposed a com-
pletely new CAS model based on a smartcard-like 
server close to the end device (network smartcard) 
able to achieve dramatic improvement in security and 
a significant reduction in the cost of the solution. 
Next, we also introduced a content-aware encryption 
scheme which again leverages the capabilities of the 
servers in the network to provide a protection archi-
tecture. It achieves the same level of resistance to 
brute force attacks as a full encryption solution, but 
requires dramatically less resources at the client side, 
and hence enables the use of low cost devices while 
maintaining the same level of security. Finally, we 
included examples of the application of the proposed 
schemes allowing improvements in robustness, relia-
bility, and scalability. 
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